Financial Perspective (2)
Derivation of an optimization approach in order to determine the optimal type of divesting. Assumptions:
• A company consists of f divisions (at least two)
• Existence of unique and joint costs
• Debt bears a certain risk (risk of insolvency)
• No inventory carry over exists

Optimal Corporate Strategy (1)
Assuming a firm with f divisions, the value maximization function is given by:
With Q j as quantity produced and sold, k j determining the divisional costs, P j denotes the price for good j and C j the cost for producing product j. Moreover, k a stands for the average cost of capital, S(Q j ) gives the non-financial overhead costs while R(D) measures the indirect cost of debt. With respect to this, the optimal product mix is given by:
Equation (3) measures the profitability of the considered company.
• Values above or equal to zero indicate that the considered company operates efficiently, i.e. it is optimal not to divest.
• If the resulting marginal value shows a negative sign, the company might be better off by divesting the company division. → But how?
Optimal Corporate Strategy (3)
Suppose, k a > k j and the company decides to separate division j. Then, the marginal value of this division prior to divestiture is determined by:
After divestiture, this market value changes to:
with M S j and M V j as "new" overhead costs and new market value respectively. In this case, the separation of the company division should take the legal form of a sell-off. The independent subsidiary will provide lower costs than as part of a joint firm.
Optimal Corporate Strategy (4)
Suppose now, k a < k j when divesting division j. Again, the marginal value of the division prior to divestiture is determined by:
After divestiture this value changes to:
As previously mentioned, the costs are at least as high as prior to divestiture such that M S j ≥ M S j . In opposite to the previous situation, the marginal value of the divested division (j) is now higher than the market value of the division within the existing entity.
• As long as the unit to be divested provides a higher marginal value than the integrated division, shareholders would decide to spin-off.
• This means in terms of capitalization rates: If the capitalization rate after divestiture increases, i.e. if the risk exposure of the firm to be divested lies above the average capitalization rate of the joint firm, a spin-off has to be favored.
• Economically, higher capitalization rates signal higher risk and higher possible returns and growth.
• Consequently, a divested marginal value below the integrated value leads to a sell-off decision, as such a division has stable operating earnings and lower growth potential.
Data
• Accounting Data provided by Amadeus.
• Dataset consists of 624 companies dealing in energy, energy distribution and energy transmission for the time period between 2003 and 2007.
• 217 distribution firms from Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Sweden and Switzerland.
• 49 transmission operators from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.
• 358 energy companies that do not deal in transmission or distribution (of energy).
For the considered sample, 45% of transmission and 60% of distribution firms show a negative profit indicating (direct) benefits for shareholders when divesting. The return on assets (ROA) can serve as proxy for a firm's profitability.
Questions:
• Are there significant differences between the different groups of firms?
Results:
• The average ROA of energy firms exceeds the ROA in the transmission or distribution area.
• Owners will be better off by divesting transmission and distribution parts.
ROA gives insights whether divestiture (or unbundling in general) can be a favorable decision for investors.
Return on Capital -legal versus ownership unbundling (1)
• Rational investors will decide in favor of ownership unbundling if the capitalization rate for energy companies exceeds the division specific discount factor.
• ROC is the modest approximation of an adequate capitalization rate which encompasses the return on equity and debt. Decision criteria:
• If k a > k j → decide in favor of sell-off (OU).
• If k a < k j → spin-off (legal unbundling) is preferred.
Return on Capital -legal versus ownership unbundling (3)
• ROCs for integrated companies exceed the discount rates for companies dealing in the transmission or distribution area solely.
• This holds for large and medium sized firms → arguing in favor of sell-off.
• It can be concluded that OU will leave owners better off than legal unbundling.
From the viewpoint of owners, ROE forms the decision variable (and seldom ROC).
• The ROE of the energy sector lies between the averaged returns of the transmission or distribution area.
• The highest returns can be found in the transmission sector which significantly exceed the ROE of energy firms on average as well as for small and medium sized firms → transmission owners should prefer legal unbundling.
• Nevertheless, no significant differences can be found for large transmission firms.
• For distribution facilities, a different picture arises (besides small firms) -equity holders will be better off with selling the distributing part of the firm and would hence prefer OU.
Conclusion (1)
• The empirical analysis showed that about 45 % of transmission and 60 % of distribution firms in 2007 should decide in favor of divesting the transporting part in Europe (because of negative profits).
• With respect to the ROA, rational agents would decide in favor of divesting a company division.
• Due to the ROC, ownership unbundling would leave investors better off if the company to be divested operates in the transmission -or energy distribution sector and earns revenues above 1 Mio. Euro.
• Contrary to this, ROC also indicates that if the transmission part to be divested is small, investors will be better off by refusing a separation of ownership and control
